Audit finds holes in Canberra's finance systems

 

Lack of DR, weak passwords and no audit trails in some systems.

The Australian National Audit Office has discovered that several of Canberra’s most critical Government agencies – including Customs, the Department of Finance and the DBCDE – have been operating financial and HR systems without adequate controls in place around user identity and security.

The ANAO report also found that Australia’s Electoral Commission failed to have adequate disaster recovery or IT security controls in place.

The discoveries were made as part of a routine annual audit of the Financial Statements of Federal Government Agencies [PDF], which included an analysis of the internal controls of major agencies.

The audit identified “weaknesses” in Customs and Border Protection’s IT security policy – including “insufficient complexity of passwords”, “lack of monitoring of privileged users” and instances where there was inappropriate approval of new users.

The audit also found weaknesses in the management of user access to Customs’ Integrated Cargo System.

The Australian Electoral Commission, meanwhile, was found wanting in terms of IT security and business continuity.

The 2009/10 audit identified that the AEC had no disaster recovery plans for all of its IT systems and had never simulated any disasters to test its business continuity.

“This increases the risk that in the event of an interruption to business operations, an accident, or a disaster, the AEC will be unable to restore critical business systems within acceptable timeframes,” the report noted.

Further, the ANAO identified that the electoral office did not comply with the Government’s Information Security Manual (ISM), but did not go into any detail.

Systems access was also an issue for the Department of Finance, the Department of Broadband, Communication and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre) and CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority).

AUSTRAC – which was also found to have breached Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines – was found to have no delegation limits to its finance system for part of the year – a situation quickly remedied post the audit.

The Department of Finance, meanwhile, was cautioned after the username and password of a “super user”- with access to high-level systems - was found freely available in plain text format on a network drive that a significant number of Finance staff had access to.

The DBCDE was not found to have any access control issues, but its finance systems lacked an adequate audit trail to determine which staff had accessed or made changes in the system.

“During the 2009–10 final audit, the ANAO confirmed that DBCDE had addressed this matter by the removal of these access privileges and by implementing a system to proactively monitor system access,” the report said.

CASA was also found to lack a sufficient audit trail with regards to its finance and HR systems. And like Customs, a number of CASA users were found to be using default passwords that were not complex enough.

“These accounts were not uniquely identifiable to an individual,” the audit noted. “This situation also provided higher levels of privileged access than  required.” 

CASA’s IT security posture was also criticised after the auditor discovered that developers had access to the IT production environment of its finance and HR systems, which the ANAO labelled “a lack of segregation of duties”.

“The  lack of segregation  of  duties  increased  the  risk  of  unauthorised,  erroneous  and/or untested  program  changes  being  implemented  into  production,  as  well  as increasing  the  risk  of  inappropriate  changes  to  the  production  environment that may not be detected in a timely manner,” the audit report said. “This situation increases the risk of CASA’s system integrity and data availability being compromised.”

CASA argued that changing the way its development and production systems operated was not cost effective – but agreed to implement systems to log access.

ANAO judged most of the breaches to be "moderate" in nature and noted that many of the agencies had already worked to improve IT security as a result.

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Audit finds holes in Canberra's finance systems
"Manging and monitoring priveleged, shared admin or root account access is way more than just password management and there are good solutions available from e-DMZ and the like but unfortunately ..."
By BaysNet
 
 
 
Comments: 9
longsword
Dec 23, 2010 10:39 AM
A fair percentage of state government agencies and private businesses would fall into same areas of oversight/poor practices as well.
redrock
Dec 23, 2010 1:44 PM
Lets face it, which agencies have ever performed a DR test let alone BCP?

Also the ANAO are not exactly credible in their selective or directed audits. The role of the ANAO should be truly independent of the public service in order to demonstrate credibility and to ensure the function is not lip service to 'minor' issues.
Ezy2Confuze
Dec 23, 2010 5:25 PM
What I find funny is the Department of Broadband, Communication and the Digital Economy which is trying to ram the net filter down our throats can't even get it's own act together when it comes to security and audit trails. Go Conjob & Co. I hope the Libs pick up on this.
chuckt2
Dec 23, 2010 6:38 PM
Who audits the auditors?
Nice one ANAO.
There is, never and will never be a question of conflict of interest between the ANAO and their selected sub-contractors.
Nor will there ever be a quality assurance check into whether those sub-contractors have the necessary skills to not infect the network they are supposed to be auditing with a virus of the day.
And lastly, there will never be any assurance that the selected auditors are up to the level of integrity and credibility through technical expertise to accurately conduct any auditing works in the field of IT Security.

You can't get blood from a stone.
Ezy2Confuze
Dec 23, 2010 7:33 PM
Following on from Chucki2's comments, we've been audited twice this year by KPMG. Both times their questions and recommendations were so out of date it was scary, these guys audit most if not all of the WA Govt. Departments for the Auditor Generals office. It also came to light that they are still on Office 2003. We are of the opinion that they have obviously created one audit template from 2001 and are continuing to use it as their template for all audits. When you shoot out words like SRM etc they are as lost as general accountants can be. Which is why when someone with real IT knowledge and understanding does an audit, the auditee is found severely lacking.
pameacs
Dec 23, 2010 9:43 PM
It is amazing when there is bodies such as ISACA who promote professional auditors that so many of these government audits are done by the Big firms and done poorly as the departments are happy with the crap report they get as it makes them look like its all ok. Proper audits of many government departments would show some sorry states in their DR, BCP and security.
djzort
Dec 24, 2010 5:30 PM
Anyone who has worked in IT longer than maybe 2 years knows what an Audit equates to.

- A large audit firm wins a tender/bid, then hands it off to some recently purchases subsidiary
- That subsidiary has been massively downsized since acquisition, so are now using their admin staff as audit staff.
- These auditors then proceed down through some check list, written by sales reps in 'security' companies (usually out of date)
- A recommendation comes back that your systems are like a bucket full of holes
- Management outsource control of firewalls to some external company (who are themselves under resourced and generally cost way too much- and the firewall usually allows GRE, SCTP and 6in4 traffic anyway)
- Internal recommendations are usually deemed 'too expensive' or placed on a 'long term roadmap'. Usually someone is then promoted sideways in to that project
- Password length is increased, and complexity. So people write their password on a post-it. Which they then post to their screen and give copies to their friends in case they are sick.
- Management often then manages to pull off something like single sign-on, so that post-it password now has access to every system the user does.
entnow
Dec 29, 2010 2:48 PM
djzort thats classic mate seems like we have both been run via the same IT sec model.your comments are so true from my perspective that its scary true.

the post it note comment so true
BaysNet
Jan 19, 2011 4:02 PM
Manging and monitoring priveleged, shared admin or root account access is way more than just password management and there are good solutions available from e-DMZ and the like but unfortunately the post it scenario djzort speaks of is extremely accurate.
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